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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - FOURTH AMENDMENT
- "KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE" RULE - The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the common law ,"knock and announce"
rule was an indispensable component of the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" requirement, and therefore, should not be subject
to a per se blanket exception.
Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997).
On December 31, 1991, the Madison, Wisconsin police obtained a
search warrant for Steiney Richards' ("Richards") hotel room
intending to search for various drugs and related paraphernalia.'
The police arrived at Richards' hotel room at approximately 3:40
a.m. 2 Officer Pharo, cloaked as a maintenance man, led the search
team accompanied by several plainclothes officers and at least one
officer in full uniform.3 After knocking on the door and upon
Richards' request for identification, Officer Pharo identified himself
as a maintenance man.4 With the safety chain still connected,
Richards opened the door slightly and observed the officer in
uniform standing among Officer Pharo and the plainclothes
officers.5 Upon viewing the uniformed officer, Richards immediately
slammed the door closed.6 The officers waited several seconds
before they began to batter down the door to gain admittance into
the locked room.7 As they entered the room, the officers caught
Richards attempting to flee through a window.8 The officers then
seized cash and cocaine stashed above the bathroom ceiling tiles of
1. Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1418 (1997). Issuance of the search warrant
culminated an extensive criminal investigation linking Richards and several other individuals
to a drug ring operating from local hotels in the Madison, Wisconsin area. Id. The police
requested a warrant that would have granted them permission to perform a "no-knock" entry
into Richards' hotel room, but the issuing magistrate specifically deleted those portions of
the warrant, denying the police such authority. Id.
2. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1419.




6. Id. At trial, some dispute existed about what transpired after Richards observed the
uniformed police officer. Nevertheless, Richards admitted that when he opened the door, he
did see the uniformed officer. Id.
7. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1419. The police testified that they identified themselves as
police officers while they were kicking and ramming Richards' door. Id.
8. Id.
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the hotel room.9
Following his arrest, 0 Richards sought to have the evidence
obtained from his hotel room suppressed" on the grounds that the
officers had failed to knock and announce their presence prior to
forcing entry into the room. 2 Richards argued that the officers'
failure to knock and announce was in direct conflict with Wilson v.
Arkansas 3 decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in
1995.14 Nevertheless, since the arresting officers could surmise from
Richards' unusual behavior that he knew they were police officers,
the trial court denied the suppression motion. 5 Richards was
subsequently convicted on a charge of Possession with Intent to
Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of Wisconsin Statute
section 961.41(1).' 6
Both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 7  and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.'" The Wisconsin
Supreme Court centered its affirmation of the trial court's decision
upon whether the recent decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Wilson v. Arkansas would force it to overrule
9. Id.
10. Richards was arrested for possession of cocaine base with intent to deliver. State
v. Richards, 549 N.W.2d 219 (Wisc. 1996).
11. "Suppression of evidence" is defined as "the ruling of a trial judge to the effect
that evidence sought to be admitted should be excluded because it was illegally acquired."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (6th ed. 1990).
12. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1419.
13. 514 U.S. 927 (1995). In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" requirement incorporates the common-law requirement that
police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and
purpose before attempting forcible entry. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. At the same time, the
Court recognized that the "flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to
mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.
Id. Furthermore, the Court "left to the lower courts the task of determining the
circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 936.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1419.
15. Id.
16. Section 961.41(1) provides, in part: (1) Manufacture, Distribution, or Delivery.
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute
or deliver a controlled substance or controlled substance analog. Wisc. STAT. § 961.41(1)
(1995-96).
17. The March 3, 1994 opinion of the court is unreported but is listed in a table at 516
N.W2d 19 (Wisc. 1994).
18. Richards, 549 N.W.2d. at 227.
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State v. Stevens,19 a pre-Wilson decision.20 In light of Wilson, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court examined its decision in Stevens,
concluding that a per se blanket exception to the knock and
announce rule could be harmonized with Wilson.2' First, the court
assumed that all felony drug crimes involved deadly risk to police
officers.22 Second, the likelihood that key evidence would be
destroyed prior to entry by law enforcement officials should create
a blanket exception.23
To buttress its conclusion, the Wisconsin court hypothesized that
the violation of privacy that occurs when police officers forcibly
enter a residence armed with a search warrant is minimal because
residents generally do not have the authority to refuse entry to the
police.24 Rather, the primary infringement on Fourth Amendment
privacy interests stems from the issuance of the search warrant
rather than the manner in which police executed the search
warrant.25 Thus, the court reaffirmed its per se blanket exception to
the knock and announce rule outlined in Stevens despite the
Wilson Court's decision to anoint the knock and announce rule an
indispensable parcel of the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness"
requirement.
26
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari27 to
determine whether Wisconsin's per se blanket exception to the
knock and announce rule in felony drug cases was constitutional in
light of Wilson.28 Although the Court unanimously affirmed the
19. 511 N.W.2d 591 (Wisc. 1994) cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1102 (1995). In Stevens, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that "when the police have a search warrant, supported by
probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of
possession with intent to deliver drugs, they necessarily have reasonable cause to believe
exigent circumstances exist [to justify a no-knock entry]." Id.
20. Richards, 549 N.W.2d. at 219.
21. Id. at 222.
22. Id.
23. Id. In determining the dangerousness of felony drug crimes, the court considered
various criminal conduct surveys, newspaper articles, and other judicial opinions. Id.
24. Id. at 226.
25. Richards, 549 N.W.2d at 226.
26. Id.
27. "Certiorari" is a writ issued by a higher court to a lower court requiring the lower
court to produce a certified record of a particular case so that the issuing court can examine
the proceedings of the preceding case to decide whether an error of law has occurred.
Frequently, this term refers to writs issued by the Supreme Court of the United States, which
uses the writ as a discretionary device to select cases it wishes to examine. BLACK'S LAW
DIcToNARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
28. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1420. Wisconsin's per se blanket exception to the knock
and announce rule only applied to felony drug cases. Id.
1998 1027
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Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision, it ultimately determined that a
per se blanket exception to the knock and announce rule ran
counter to the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement,
and was therefore, unconstitutional.
29
In addition to rejecting Wisconsin's per se blanket exception to
the knock and announce rule, the Court determined that to justify
a no-knock' entry, the police officers must have a "reasonable
suspicion" that their safety is in jeopardy or that the "effective
investigation of the crime" would be thwarted.30 Applying those
factors to the circumstances in Richards, the Court decided that
the officers' no-knock entry into Richards' hotel room did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers had a
reasonable suspicion that Richards might flee or destroy evidence if
they did not apprehend him immediately.31
To justify its institution of this test, the Court invoked two public
policy concerns to support its rejection of Wisconsin's per se
blanket exception to the knock and announce rule.32 First, the
blanket exception is considerably overgeneralized because not
every drug investigation poses risks sufficient to justify an intrusion
upon the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement
through per se no-knock entries.-' Second, by upholding a per se
exception to the knock and announce rule in one category of
dangerous crimes, that same exception could be applied to other
categories of dangerous crimes such as armed robbery.34 The Court
concluded that although "felony drug investigations may frequently
present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry," that fact
29. Id. at 1422.
30. Id. at 1421. More specifically, the Court held: "In order to justify a 'no-knock'
entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their
presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence." Id. This standard, the Court reasoned, would strike "the appropriate balance
between legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants
and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries." Id.
31. Id. at 1422.
32. Id. at 1421.
33. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421. The Court provided two examples of
overgeneralization." First, a search may be conducted at a time when the only individuals
present in a residence may be totally unconnected with drug activities and, therefore,
unlikely to harm police or destroy evidence. Id. Second, the police may know that the drugs
that are the subject of the search are of a type or in a location making it impossible to
destroy quickly. Id.
34. Id. The court cited armed robbery as a crime to which Wisconsin's per se
exception could easily be applied due to the dangerousness of the crime and the relative
ease of destroying the fruits of such crime. Id.
1028 Vol. 36:1025
"cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the
reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce
in a particular case."
35
Within Richards, the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness"
requirement provided a solid foundation for the Justices to bolster
their decision concerning the knock and announce rule.36 However,
until the middle of the twentieth century the knock and announce
rule was simply a remnant of English common law not rooted in
any Constitutional provision.37 The origins of the knock and
announce rule38 can be traced back to Semayne's Case,39 decided in
1603.40 Although Semayne's Case did not involve forcible entry,
41
the English court nevertheless decided that when the King is a
party to a dispute, the sheriff may break the doors of the dwelling
to arrest the occupant or carry out the execution of the King's
business.42 The court, however, qualified its decision by concluding
that before the sheriff may break down any doors, he must identify
himself and the purpose for which he has arrived at the residence. 3
The court seemed reluctant to permit any property destruction
without the owner's knowledge of the reasons the sheriff had
arrived at the residence.44
Pursuant to state constitutional provisions and/or statutes, the
English common law knock and announce rule spread quickly
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1422.
37. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931.
38. For an in depth discussion of the common law origins of the knock and announce
rule, See G. Robert Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v.
United States; Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L REv. 499, 500-04 (1964).
39. 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (KB. 1603).
40. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931.
41. Semayne's Case concerned a sheriff executing a civil writ of attachment levied
upon certain property within Peter Semayne's residence. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at
194-95. In modern parlance, "attachment" is defined as: "The legal process of seizing
another's property in accordance with a writ or judicial order for the purpose of securing
satisfaction of a judgment yet to be rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 126 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931.
43. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 194-95. See Case of Richard Curtis, Fost. 135, 137,
168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (Crown 1757) (extending the rule of Semayne's Case to criminal
actions: "No precise form of words is required in a case of this kind. It is sufficient that the
party hath notice, that the officer cometh not as a mere trespasser, but claiming to act under
a proper authority.. ."). Id. See also Lee v. Gansell, Lofft 374, 381-82, 98 Eng. Rep. 700, 705
(KB. 1774) ("[Als to the outer door, the law is now clearly taken" that it is privileged; but
the door may be broken "when the due notification and demand has been made and
refused"). Id.
44. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 194-95.
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through the United States in the late 18th century.45 In accordance
with such incorporation provisions, early American courts followed
the common law knock and announce rule.46 Furthermore, in 1917,
Congress codified the common law knock and announce rule
regarding federal officers executing search warrants in Title 11 of
the Espionage Act.
47
Despite such widespread acceptance of the common law knock
and announce rule, the Supreme Court never squarely confronted
the issue until 1958 in Miller v. United States.48 In Miller, the Court
addressed whether evidence seized after a no-knock entry into
"Blue" Miller's ("Miller") apartment should be suppressed. 49 Federal
officers entered Miller's apartment after an arrested informant,
Clifford Reed, revealed to the officers that he purchased heroin
from Miller through an individual who regularly trafficked drugs for
Miller. ° The officers not only failed to enter the residence equipped
with an arrest or search warrant, they also failed to demand
45. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933. Pennsylvania incorporated English common law (including
the knock and announce rule) in the Act of Dec. 23, 1780, ch. 925, section 5. 10 STATUTES AT
LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 255 (J. Mitchell & H. Flanders comp. 1904).
46. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933. See, e.g., Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1813); Walker v. Fox, 32 Ky. 404, 405 (1834); Chipman v. Bates, 15 Vt. 51, 60 (1843); Burton v.
Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186, 189 (1846); Howe v. Butterfield, 58 Mass. 302, 305 (1849); Barnard v.
Bartlett, 64 Mass. (1 Cush.) 501, 503 (1852); Jacobs v. Measures, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 74, 75
(1859). See also Blakey, supra note 38, at 504-09.
47. Espionage Act, ch. 30, tit. XI, §§ 8-9, 40 Stat. 217, 228-29 (1917). See also Jennifer
M. Goddard, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock and Announce Rule: A
Call for Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B. U. L REV. 449, 456 (1995). Sections 8
and 9 of Title 11 were later codified by Congress at 18 U.S.C. section 3109 (1988), which
provides: "The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a
person aiding him in the execution of the warrant." Id.
48. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
49. Miller, 357 U.S. at 302.
50. Id. at 302-03. Enlisting Reed's help to arrest Miller and Shepherd, an undercover
officer accompanied Reed to Shepherd's residence armed with $100 in marked cash in order
to purchase 100 capsules of heroin. Id. at 302. Upon Shepherd's acceptance of the $100 from
the undercover officer to procure the heroin from Miller, other federal officers followed
Shepherd to Miller's apartment. Id. at 303. After Shepherd exited Miller's apartment, he was
arrested several blocks away and admitted that he had purchased 100 capsules of heroin
from Miller with the marked currency provided earlier in the evening by the undercover
officer. Id.
The officers then returned to Miller's apartment, knocked on the door, and identified
themselves in a low voice as "police" when Miller inquired as to who was at his door. Id.
Miller then opened the door to inquire why the officers were there, but before they could
answer, Miller attempted to close the apartment door. Id. Before Miller could close the door,
however, the officers placed their hands inside the door, ripped off the safety chain, and
subsequently entered the residence to arrest Miller. Id. at 303-04.
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admission to the residence, or even state their purpose for being
there, prior to seizing marked money and arresting Miller.51 Both
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit denied Miller's motion to suppress the evidence seized from
his apartment.5 2
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed, declaring
that Semayne's Case continues to endure, and therefore, the
officers should have knocked and announced their intentions when
arriving at Miller's apartment.53 Furthermore, the Court noted that
the enactment of 18 U.S.C. section 3109 obviously reflected
Congress' intention to codify the knock and announce rule outlined
in Semayne's Case.5" Thus, applying the language of 18 U.S.C.
section 3109 to the facts at issue, the Court reversed the lower
courts' decisions and suppressed the evidence obtained after the
officers barged into Miller's apartment unannounced.5 5 Although the
Miller decision officially indoctrinated the knock and announce
rule into American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of the United
States still had not addressed the question of whether an
unannounced entry violated the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" requirement.5
Just five years later, however, the United States Supreme Court,
in Ker v. California,7 addressed whether an unannounced entry is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness"
requirement.5 In Ker, law enforcement officials also seized
inculpatory evidence 59  after an unannounced entry6O into a
51. Id. at 304.
52. Id. at 302.
53. Id. at 308. The Miller opinion, now famous in knock and announce discourse, was
penned by Justice Brennan. Goddard, supra note 47, at 458.
54. Miller, 357 U.S. at 308-09.
55. Id. at 313.
56. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933. Rather, as previously mentioned, the Court chose to focus
its decision upon the rule enunciated in Semayne's Case and 18 U.S.C. section 3109. Id.
57. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
58. See Goddard, supra note 47, at 465.
59. "Inculpatory evidence" is "evidence, going or tending to establish guilt; that which
tends to incriminate." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 768 (6th ed. 1990). Instantly, the seized
marijuana was used at trial to establish the guilt of Ker. Ker, 374 U.S. at 29.
60. Ker, 374 U.S. at 29. In Ker, four Los Angeles County police officers arrived at Ker's
apartment with probable cause to arrest him on narcotics violations after witnessing a drug
transaction between Ker and another man. Id. at 28. Immediately after witnessing the drug
transaction, the officers attempted to follow Ker as he drove off in his car but lost track of
him. Id. at 27. Consequently, utilizing Ker's vehicle registration number to obtain his address,
the officers proceeded to Ker's apartment complex. Id. at 28.
1998 1031
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residence.61  The factual scenario of Ker was not readily
distinguishable from Miller.62 However, for the first time, the Court
chose to analyze the unannounced entry in terms of whether the
entry was consistent with the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" requirement.6
The Ker Court ultimately affirmed the defendant's convictions in
a 5-4 vote that produced plurality opinions from both Justice Clark
and Justice Brennan. Justice Clark's plurality opinion,r4 which
ultimately prevailed, declared that the officer's failure to knock and
announce did not violate the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness"
requirement. 65 In formulating his decision, Justice Clark first
determined that the lawfulness of the arrests should be determined
under California state law.6 While acknowledging that California
had adopted the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. section 3109 for
governing the execution of search and arrest warrants, Justice
Clark recognized that California courts had articulated certain
exceptions to the knock and announce rule.
67
Justice Clark then assessed the constitutionality of California's
After learning that Ker's apartment was indeed occupied, the officers obtained a key from
the building manager. Id. at 1628. Without knocking or announcing his presence, one officer
quietly opened the apartment door and found Ker sitting in the living room. Id. After the
lone officer identified himself and his companions as police officers, he proceeded to the
kitchen of the apartment where he observed a brick of marijuana on the kitchen table. Id.
Ker and his wife were then arrested for suspicion of violating California's Narcotics Law;
although Ker contended that he and his wife were arrested before the police saw any
marijuana. Id. Marijuana was also found in a kitchen cupboard, a bedroom dresser, and an
automobile registered to Ker's wife. Id. All of the seized marijuana was introduced as
evidence against Ker and his wife at trial. Id.
61. Id. at 24-25.
62. See supra notes 51 and 61 and accompanying text.
63. Ker, 374 U.S. at 25. More specifically, the Court relied on its rationale in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) to analyze the issues before it, Ker, 374 U.S. at 25. Mapp held that
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ker, 374
U.S. at 30.
64. Ker, 374 U.S. at 24. Justice Clark was joined by Justice Black, Justice Stewart, and
Justice White. Justice Harlan concurred in the decision. Id. Justice Brennan was joined in
dissent by Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas, and Justice Goldberg. Id. at 46 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
65. Id. at 45.
66. Id. The relevant California law cited by Justice Clark was embodied in the
California Penal Code, section 844, which essentially mirrored the language of 18 U.S.C.
section 3109 (1988).
67. Ker, 374 U.S. at 38. Justice Clark specifically pointed to People v. Maddox, which
held that when an officer has a "good faith belier that compliance with the relevant knock
and announce rule is excused, then the officer's failure to comply with the rule does not
mandate the exclusion of the evidence he obtained as a result of the unannounced entry.
People v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 858 (1956)..
1032
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exceptions to the knock and announce rule in light of the Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio.6 Justice Clark concluded that the
exceptions did not "offend federal constitutional standards of
reasonableness" for two main reasons.69 First, Justice Clark stated
that although the knock and announce rule was nearly absolute at
common law, courts had carved out exceptions, principally when
exigent circumstances existed. 0 Second, Justice Clark distinguished
Miller by noting that neither exigent circumstances nor precedent
finding specific exceptions to the knock and announce rule were
mentioned in Miller.71 In contrast, exigent circumstances allowing
an exception to the knock and announce rule were readily
identifiable in Ker.72 Consequently, the Court held that the officer's
unannounced entry into the Kers' apartment was not a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.7 3
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, mirrored his sentiments in
Miller, and concluded that the police officer's entry into the Kers'
apartment did indeed violate the knock and announce rule in
violation of the Kers' Fourth Amendment rights.7 4 Justice Brennan
opined that only three specific instances exist when the Fourth
Amendment permits an unannounced intrusion into the inner
sanctum of a person's residence.7 5  Then, after a thorough
recapitulation of the history of the knock and announce rule,
6
Justice Brennan concluded that the officers who initiated the
no-knock entry into the Kers' residence were not justified under
any of three exceptions he had previously outlined or any
68. Ker, 374 U.S. at 38. As explained in note 63 supra, Mapp held that the Fourth
Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655..
69. Ker, 374 U.S. at 38.
70. Id. Justice Clark did not cite any particular case law to elucidate this point Id.
71. Id. In a footnote, the Court also distinguished the instant facts from the facts of
Wong v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), where the government failed to assert exigent
circumstances as a defense to the failure of federal officers to knock and announce before
entry into a dwelling. Ker, 374 U.S. at 38-39.
72. Ker, 374 U.S. at 38-39.
73. Id. at 39.
74. Id. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id. The three instances Justice Brennan highlighted were: "(1) where the persons
within already know of the officers' authority and purpose, or (2) where the officers are
justified in the belief that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where
those within, made aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there
has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the
belief that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted." Id.
76. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
1998 1033
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exceptions enunciated under common law.77 Therefore, Justice
Brennan believed that the unannounced entry of the officer's into
the Kers' residence violated the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" standard.78
In the Ker decision, the Court seemed to suggest that when
examining a knock and announce issue, it would apply the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" standard to judge the validity of a
police officer's unannounced entry into a residence. Nonetheless,
only five years later, the Court reverted to its reasoning in Miller in
deciding the case of Sabbath v. United States.79 Without mentioning
the Fourth Amendment implications, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's decision that the officers' unannounced entry into
Sabbath's apartment was lawful.80 Similar to its rationale in Miller,
the Court strictly interpreted 18 U.S.C. section 3109 and determined
that the officers had a duty to knock and announce their presence
before entering Sabbath's unlocked apartment.8'
In 1995, the Court left no doubt as to the direct implication of
the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement in its
analysis of knock and announce rule issues in Wilson v.
Arkansas.82 In Wilson, the Court addressed whether the common
77. Ker, 374 U.S. at 52-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. 391 U.S. 585 (1968). In Sabbath, federal officers in Los Angeles failed to knock and
announce their presence at Johnny Sabbath's door before entering his unlocked apartment to
arrest him on narcotics violations. Id. at 586. The officers seized cocaine and drug packaging
materials which were introduced against Sabbath at trial. Id.
Despite the officers' failure to knock and announce, Sabbath was tried and convicted in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division, a
decision affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to decide whether or not the officers' entry
was consistent with federal law. Id. at 589.
80. Id. at 588.
81. Id. The Court found that 18 U.S.C. section 3109 applied to unlocked doors as well.
Id. at 589.
82. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). On December 31, 1992, the Arkansas State
Police obtained a search warrant for Wilson's home after a police informant had purchased
drugs from her on numerous occasions. Id. at 929. Upon the officers' arrival at Wilson's
home, they found the main door of her home to be unlocked. Id.
Consequently, without knocking and announcing their presence, the officers entered the
residence and identified themselves as police officers armed with a search warrant. Id. The
officers seized marijuana, methamphetamines, valium, narcotics paraphernalia, a gun, and
ammunition. Id. Wilson and her roommate were subsequently arrested and charged with
delivery of marijuana and methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
possession of marijuana. Id. at 930.
Wilson filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search on the grounds that
the officers failed to knock and announce their presence before they entered the residence.
Id. The trial court denied the motion, Wilson was convicted, and the Arkansas Supreme
1034
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law knock and announce rule was a part of the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement. 3 After reversing and
remanding Wilson's conviction on various drug charges, the Court
delved extensively into the history of the common law knock and
announce rule,8 concluding that the rule was deeply "embedded in
Anglo-American law."85 After reaching such a historically-based
conclusion, the Court held that the common law knock and
announce rule was a fundamental component of the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement.86 The Court, however,
also recognized that exceptions to the knock and announce rule
may exist when exigent circumstances arise, rendering the
unannounced entry reasonable.87 Consequently, the Court relegated
to the lower courts the duty of determining whether an exigent
circumstance and whether an unannounced entry is accordingly
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.8
The Wilson decision finally settled nearly forty years of
confusion and wavering in the Court's analysis of knock and
announce issues in light of Ker and Sabbath.s9 However, the Wilson
Court's failure to provide specific criteria for the analysis of
no-knock entries provided justification for per se blanket
exceptions to the knock and announce rule similar to the exception
adopted by Wisconsin in Richards.90  Wilson provided such
justification by granting trial courts the ultimate power to
Court affirmed on appeal. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of
whether the common law knock and announce rule was included in the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" requirement. Id.
83. Id. at 931.
84. Id. at 931-32. The court cited a variety of English cases but focused mainly on
Semayne's Case in its historical account of the common law knock and announce rule. Id.
85. Id. at 934.
86. Id. at 936.
87. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936. The government asserted that the unannounced entry was
justified because the officers had a reasonable belief that announcing would place their lives
in peril or present a risk that Wilson would destroy the articles meant to be seized. Id.
Because the Arkansas Supreme Court did not address whether an exigent circumstance
exception existed, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
findings. Id.
88. Id.
89. As previously noted, the Court's 1963 decision in Ker relied on the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard to uphold the defendants' convictions. Ker, 374 U.S.
at 37. A mere five years later, the Court reverted to Miller's statutory interpretation analysis
to suppress evidence seized in a no-knock entry. Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 589.
90. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1420. Other states have adopted per se blanket exceptions
to the knock and announce rule in the context of drug investigations, such as Colorado in
People v. Lujan, 484 P. 2d 1238, 1241 (Colo. 1971) (en banc), and Maryland in Henson v.
State, 204 A. 2d 516, 519-20 (Md. 1964). Id.
1998 1035
Duquesne Law Review
determine when a no-knock entry is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.9' Thus, with no prevailing guidelines to mold their
decisions, trial courts were free to impose per se exceptions to the
knock and announce rule if they believed such exceptions were
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Richards decision provided teeth to the Justices' conclusions
in Wilson by expounding a specific adaptable test to determine
when a no-knock entry complies with the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" requirement. Consequently, in order to justify a
no-knock entry, police must now have "reasonable suspicion" that
lives are in danger or that an "effective investigation of the crime"
would be thwarted through destruction of evidence or escape by
the suspects.92 Such a test provides a solid middle ground in which
to analyze knock and announce issues, and protects both the police
interest in investigating crime and the public interest in being free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.93 More importantly, the
"reasonable suspicion" test prevents trial courts from adopting per
se blanket exceptions to the knock and announce rule because all
no-knock entries must pass muster under the test on a case-by-case
basis.9
In conclusion, Richards represents the culmination of
incorporating the common law knock and announce rule into the
rubric of American constitutional law through the utilization of the
Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement. Wilson sounded
the trumpet in establishing that the knock and announce rule was
an integral parcel of the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness"
requirement.95 Richards, however, symbolizes a final chapter to the
Supreme Court's history of indecision in recognizing the knock and
announce rule as an invaluable tenet of the Fourth Amendment. By
establishing a litmus test for knock and announce issues, courts at
all levels can now decisively recognize the Fourth Amendment
issues before them and the proper test by which to weigh those
issues.96
Brian Simmons
91. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
92. Id. The Richards Court subscribed to the same test in reaching its decision not to
suppress inculpatory evidence. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1420.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
96. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
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